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Abstract
With the rise of computing devices, the security robustness of the devices has
become of utmost importance. Companies invest huge sums of money, time and effort
in security analysis and vulnerability testing of their software products. Bug bounty
programs are held which incentivize security researchers for finding security holes
in software. Once holes are found, software firms release security patches for their
products.
The semiconductor industry has flourished with accelerated innovation. Fab-
less manufacturing has reduced the time-to-market and lowered the cost of produc-
tion of devices. Fabless paradigm has introduced trust issues among the hardware
designers and manufacturers. Increasing dependence on computing devices in per-
sonal applications as well as in critical infrastructure has given a rise to hardware
attacks on the devices in the last decade. Reverse engineering and IP theft are major
challenges that have emerged for the electronics industry.
Integrated circuit design companies experience a loss of billions of dollars be-
cause of malicious acts by untrustworthy parties involved in the design and fabrication
process, and because of attacks by adversaries on the electronic devices in which the
chips are embedded.
To counter these attacks, researchers have been working extensively towards
finding strong countermeasures. Hardware obfuscation techniques make the reverse
ii
engineering of device design and functionality difficult for the adversary. The goal
is to conceal or lock the underlying intellectual property of the integrated circuit.
Obfuscation in hardware circuits can be implemented to hide the gate-level design,
layout and the IP cores.
Our work presents a novel hardware obfuscation design through reconfigurable
finite field arithmetic units, which can be employed in various error correction and
cryptographic algorithms. The effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed methods
are verified by an obfuscated Reformulated Inversion-less Berlekamp-Massey (RiBM)
architecture based Reed-Solomon decoder. Our experimental results show the hard-
ware implementation of RiBM based Reed-Solomon decoder built using reconfigurable
field multiplier designs. The proposed design provides only very low overhead with
improved security by obfuscating the functionality and the outputs. The design pro-
posed in our work can also be implemented in hardware designs of other algorithms
that are based on finite field arithmetic. However, our main motivation was to target
encryption and decryption circuits which store and process sensitive data and are
used in critical applications.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
For a long time, cybersecurity study and research was focused on information
and software security concerning the protection of the integrity of data and the confi-
dentiality of data while on storage for computation or in transmission. Software-based
security research has brought our technology forward by providing us with various
forms of encryption and decryption methods, passwords and bio-metric identification
codes, digital signatures, anti-virus tools, etc. It also has helped us develop method-
ologies and tools to identify and analyze malicious codes that leverage properties of
the system’s hardware.
However, security management of modern electronic systems can no longer
be based on the contestable and sometimes naive assumption that the underlying
hardware is trusted and secure. The hardware includes the processor, the chips,
integrated circuits, motherboard and other electronic systems that allow us to run
the software. With the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) and wearable technology,
the technology is no more limited to a black box kept seemingly secured in one’s
apartment or office premise. The data being provided to big data companies by
third-party corporations, governments as well as the general public has become more
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sensitive. Thus, the potential ramifications of a single data breach can be far-reaching
with disastrous consequences for all the parties involved. Therefore, the security of the
data centres and portable devices, as well as the secure transmission of all such data,
has become if great importance. For this purpose, not only software but also hardware
needs to be evaluated for security and tested for any unauthorized modifications.
In recent years itself, many hardware vulnerabilities have been discovered in
the integrated circuits and processor chips that are popularly being used in consumer
electronics, computers, data centres, government offices, military equipment and the
portions of critical infrastructure. For instance, modern processors from leading pro-
cessor manufacturers were affected by Meltdown [30] and Spectre [24] vulnerabilities,
from which the attackers could gain access to the data being processed on the hard-
ware. Processors were in use in almost all computing systems. Though fixes for these
vulnerabilities were released, they reduced the performance of the processor by up to
25%. There have also been discoveries of back-doors in ICs know as Hardware Tro-
jans which can stealthily cause an IC malfunction. These are just two examples of
malicious hardware tampering. There are other major concerns in today’s hardware
manufacturing supply chain such as IC counterfeiting and IP piracy.
1.1 Hardware Attacks
In today’s semiconductor industry, a device usually involves a long supply
chain from design to final packaging as shown in Figure 1.1. Due to the high cost
of foundries and high design complexity of new chips, the supply chain spreads over
multiple countries, companies and third-party vendors. Every stage of the supply
chain may involve global suppliers who may or may not be trustworthy.
This might apparently seem beneficial from the monetary perspective as it
2
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Figure 1.1: IC supply chain
reduces the time to market of the electronic products, as well as saves the cost.
However, it also introduces new security challenges through the supply chain which
may cause the organization to incur losses later on. Tampering hardware design and
pirating the design by any of the third party vendors can result in huge losses to the
IC design company in terms of profits as well as in terms of consumer trust.
Hardware Trojans may be inserted into the chips by the fabrication house.
Contrary to the expectation of the IP provider, the final product may contain mali-
cious logic and flaws that an attacker can exploit after the chips are embedded into
the devices. Post-deployment, reverse engineering against ICs on the other hand may
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also provide adversaries with hardware vulnerabilities or valuable IP information.
1.1.1 Attacks through the IC supply chain
There are two major stages in the semiconductor manufacturing process.
• Design Stage: Using a register transfer level language (RTL) such as VHDL
or (System) Verilog, a design specification is described. Thereafter a synthesis
tool is used to synthesize the design into a gate-level netlist. This netlist file
is then used to generate a layout file which contains the information regarding
the location and shapes of the cells. The layout file also has information about
the routing paths between the gates. This file is used for chip fabrication.
• Fabrication Stage: For fabrication of the chips, masks such as photo-masks
are required for lithography. These masks are produced using the (GDSII)
layout file as a reference. The final product has the chip packaged and assembled
onto a printed circuit board. To accelerate the delivery and lower the costs,
most IC companies outsource the fabrication to off-shore foundries which work
autonomously without any direct monitoring by the IP providing company.
Both of these stages have potential for attacks.
1.1.1.1 Design Stage Attacks
In the design stage, three of the potential security threats are a malicious
design party, an untrusted IP from a third party, and the design tools bought from a
third party. An employee in the project team who has full access to the chip design,
if gone rogue, can modify the design to include malicious logic or backdoors. This
might not be even discovered by the team and the company until and even after the
product has been launched in the market.
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Additionally, a rogue employee can sell the design’s IP to a competitor firm
which can then claim ownership of the design or can sabotage the market of the
original designer firm by producing the chips based on the design illegally. These
categories of attacks are commonly referred to as IP piracy and IP counterfeiting.
Untrusted IP vendors may provide IPs with built-in backdoors, sabotaging the entire
hardware design. This can allow attackers who know about the IP design to cause
the device to malfunction under target conditions.
Designers and hardware testers often rely on third-party design tools for design
optimization and verification of the design. However, these tools also pose a potential
threat to the design as they might tamper the results produced. These kinds of attacks
are referred to as Hardware Trojan attacks.
1.1.1.2 Fabrication Stage Attacks
Outsourcing of IC designs by the IC design companies to fabrication foundry
houses is a common trend today. This lowers the gross cost of production of the
final product as well as reduces the time-to-market of the product. However, the
foundries, if not trustworthy, can pirate or tamper the designs by the actions of a
single unethical employee of the foundry. By reverse engineering the design obtained
from the contracting IC design company, the foundry can obtain gate-level design
knowledge of the IP and sell the information to competing design firms. This comes
under IP piracy.
In addition to this, the foundry can overproduce the chip for their own profit,
spooning out profit from the IC designer. Since the foundry doesn’t own the design,
the overproduced chips may not go through proper testing and may be of much lower
quality than the ones being sold by the IC designer. This IC overproduction by
the foundry may result in reputation and profit loss for the IC designer company.
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Foundries can also try to gain unauthorized profits by selling old out-of-spec chips by
relabeling them as new chips. Counterfeiting of chips includes recycled chips as well
as fake chips. Modification of the layout by an employee in a foundry may also cause
a hardware Trojan to be inserted into the design leading to the production of a huge
number of infected chips, trusted by the IC designer and its clients.
1.1.2 Attacks on hardware post-production
With increasing widespread adoption of computing systems in our daily lives
and in the corporate industry, in terms of embedded systems, wearable technologies,
portable devices, IoT devices and data centre firms for cloud services, attacks on
hardware post-deployment to the client are also becoming major concerns. Recently,
there were reports on evidence of security backdoors in the chips used in weaponry
systems, nuclear power plants and transportation systems used by the military. This
clearly indicates the urgency of hardware protection. Post-deployment attacks can be
mainly categorized into Reverse engineering, Fault injection attacks and Side channel
attacks. We discuss two of these categories which are more relevant to our work.
• Reverse Engineering: By depackaging the chip and then delayering it, an
adversary can reverse engineer the internal design of the chip and use that
information to exploit a vulnerability or change the behaviour in the target chip
of the same design. Reverse engineering in the final product is not easy and
requires considerable resources, time, patience and knowledge on the adversary’s
part.
• Side Channel Attacks: Hardware device could leak some information in the
form of heat signatures, power consumption, sound or electromagnetic radiation.
After enough data are accumulated, the data can be analyzed and associated
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with the operation being processed inside the chip. This enables the adversary
to gain insight about the confidential data such as encryption/decryption keys
from the memory on the chip. This side channel information from modern mi-
croprocessors was the concern behind the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities
in the modern processors, discovered in 2017. The vulnerabilities allowed an
adversarial process to gain the data of another process from the memory, which
ideally is a security design flaw.
1.2 Hardware Security
Due to the growing discovery of such potential attacks and the alarmingly
rising risk they put on the people, infrastructure, governments, military and trade,
designers have to come up with methods to protect the IP of their designs. It has be-
come necessary to develop methods against reverse engineering for hardware devices.
Widely used countermeasures to reverse engineering are discussed as follows.
1.2.1 Circuit Camouflaging
IC camouflaging is a technique to design the layout in a manner to thwart
the attempts of reverse engineering attempted through electron microscopy. Electron
microscopy allows the adversary to visually see the cells on the IC, enabling him
to potentially obtain the gate level layout of the chip. To implement camouflaging,
some standard gate cells are made identical in shape so that they are difficult to
identify in the images obtained through an electron microscope. Additionally, dummy
contacts are also created which appear to be connected in the images but are actually
disconnected being only a small distance apart. It makes it difficult for the attacker
to deduce the exact functionality and netlist when these techniques are used.
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1.2.2 Logic Encryption
Adding some additional gates known as the key gates to the design, designers
can lock the correct functionality of the chip. The key gates obtain input from the
chip’s I/O. A correct input to the key gates activates the correct functionality of the
chip. This technique is also called logic locking or logic obfuscation.
1.3 Cryptography and Error Correcting Codes
Cryptography is the area of research where methods and algorithms are de-
veloped to hide information from unauthorized access and to authenticate the source
while maintaining the integrity of the message. Error correcting codes (ECC) are
used to detect and correct errors that might infect a message when received via a
noisy communication channel, therefore protecting the integrity of the message from
sending party to the receiving end. ECC and cryptography are used in different
scenarios. However, both perform the encoding of the information to execute their
respective purposes.
1.4 Contribution and Thesis Organization
In this dissertation, we focus on the logic obfuscation methods for error correct-
ing codes and crytographic algorithms that are primarily based on finite field algebra.
The hardware implementations of coding theory based algorithms usually employ a
number of basic arithmetic units such as adders and multipliers. The adders and
multipliers are specifically designed for finite field based addition and multiplication
operations. The devices implementing cryptography and ECC are one of the most
popular applications that work on the concept of finite field coding theory, and use a
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numerous finite field adders and multipliers. We focus on such arithmetic circuits in
our work.
We propose reconfigurable designs by exploiting the concepts of hardware ob-
fuscation for finite field arithmetic. The design of the adder and the multiplier is
dependent on a set of chosen parameters. Thus, to prevent reverse engineering of the
hardware, the design and functionality of the arithmetic units should be obfuscated.
Our work provides a method to deceive the adversary and making it difficult for
him to guess the set of chosen parameters that make the circuit work correctly. Our
method also results in very low hardware overheads which is an important aspect for
real world application of the new hardware design.
1.5 Thesis Overview
The thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 1, we discussed the various
security challenges that the semiconductor industry faces. Our main focus is to
propose a design methodology for improving the security of ICs.
In chapter 2, we present the background of the process of IC design and man-
ufacturing and discuss the potential points of attacks. Additionally, we elaborate on
the types of attacks in the field of hardware security and go over the recent research
progress in the field of hardware obfuscation. Cryptography and Error Correction
Codes and their applications have also been discussed to emphasize the importance
and potential contribution of this work in the chip design for such applications.
In chapter 3, we provide a background on finite field arithmetic and its appli-
cation in coding theory. We also describe the process of Reed Solomon encoding and
decoding to provide a foundation for the reader to understand our research method-
ology and the nature of this research work.
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In chapter 4, we go over the recent findings and proposed designs that helped
us shape and improve our experimental setup. We also describe the implementation
of our version of the Reed-Solomon decoder inspired from recent academic research
findings and discuss the methodology used to obtain and analyze the results.
In chapter 5, we present our findings from our experiment. Our experiment
involves using our method for obfuscation of finite field based circuits to implement
obfuscation in Reed Solomon error correcting codes by the use of re-configurable units
of finite field computation. We produce results for different scenarios and analyze
them to conclude and strengthen the confidence of our findings.
In chapter 6, we present the conclusion of our research findings and discuss
the potential implications of our results. We also briefly talk about potential future
research in this field.
10
Chapter 2
Hardware Obfuscation
Hardware obfuscation transforms an original design into a functional equiva-
lent version that is much harder to reverse engineer. Hardware obfuscation can be
realized via various ways [45, 28, 25, 9, 8, 16, 18, 40, 27, 20].
2.1 Importance of Hardware Obfuscation
There have been events concerning IP theft and reverse engineering among
big firms as well as small agencies. In 2016, FPGA manufacturer Xilinx accused
a popular chip supplier Flextronics of violating its IP contract. Xilinx stated that
Flextronics bought chips from Xilinx on the pretext of a different consumer market
and then sold the chips at higher rates after branding them as higher grade chips [33].
In the economics of it, Xilinx was exposed to higher liabilities.
Understanding the competitor’s product is something not very unexpected in
today’s era and large firms do spend time and resources reverse engineering competi-
tors’ products. The laws of IP protection vary vastly from country to country and it
is not easy for a company to protect its IP [44] and prevent another corporation from
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using the IP to develop and sell products with no compensation to the IP holder.
Because of the variation in laws and degree of law enforcement in different areas,
patents and copyrights do not provide complete assurance to the IP holder. Thus, IP
protection needs to be enforced actively by the designers if they want to avoid loss of
profits and trust.
Obfuscation cannot be converted into such mathematical algorithms. Also,
the encryption and decryption of the hardware design requires additional gate logic
added to the design. Since encryption algorithms involve multiple copies of similar
manipulation blocks, it also increases the area and power overheads considerably.
Additionally, due to the presence of multiple identical blocks in the design,
it is easy for an adversary at the fabrication house having access to the layout for
fabrication purpose, to deduce the gates responsible for the encryption logic. The
adversary can simply remove these gates to produce the unencrypted fully functional
chip. Add to this the logistic overhead and inconvenience that would be encountered
while sending these chips for testing.
An obfuscated form P ′() of an operation P () is analogous to a virtual black
box that can be used by a user to obtain an output P (x) for an input x without
knowing the exact structure of P (). It was stated in [2] that perfect virtual black box
obfuscation is unachievable for all operations. Specifically, it was argued that Boolean
circuits were inherently unobfuscable. Consequently, an obfuscated form P ′() of the
program P () can be exploited to extract a key information about P () or the entire
program P () itself with a probability greater than zero.
Though perfect obfuscation which leaks no information about the output to
input relation of the program, is impossible to achieve, there is a ’best possible ob-
fuscation’ with relatively relaxed constraints that can be achieved. Best possible ob-
fuscation relaxes the strict constraint of the perfect black box obfuscation and relies
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on the following constraint: An obfuscated program P ′() is allowed to leak the least
amount of information that can be leaked by any other program which implements
the same function F () as being implemented by the program P (). Consequently, from
the set of all programs that perform the function F (), none should reveal any infor-
mation more than that revealed by any other program in the set about the function
F () to the adversary.
Another concept that is related to the above is indistinguishable obfuscation
[6]. Indistinguishable obfuscation means that for two programs P () and Q() that
implement the same function F (), there exists an indistinguishability obfuscator O()
such that the respective obfuscated programs O(P ()) = P ′() and O(Q()) = Q′() are
indistinguishable from each other. However, it has been shown that indistinguisha-
bility is not achievable in practice [2]. Nonetheless, there have been consistent efforts
in the academic community towards enhancing the security strength of partial obfus-
cation. In the next section, we discuss some of the representative work in the field of
hardware obfuscation.
2.2 Recent Work in Hardware Obfuscation
Numerous hardware obfuscation techniques have been proposed by researchers
in the literature. Figure 2.1 shows a taxonomy of various techniques of implementing
hardware obfuscation. We discuss some of those methods briefly below.
2.2.1 Layout Level Obfuscation
Layout level obfuscation is used as a countermeasure against reverse engineer-
ing [34]. The most popular method is camouflaging [13, 29]. Standard cells such
as XOR, NAND and NOR gates are designed to appear identical in the layout by
13
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Figure 2.1: Hardware obfuscation designs
having the same shape and size. Additionally, contacts that are not actually forming
a closed circuit, known as dummy contacts which appear to connect two cells in the
layout images are helpful in confusing the adversary about the actual design of the
circuit. This makes it difficult for the adversary to retrieve the exact netlist. How-
ever, to have a considerable level of security, a large number of such camouflaged gates
might be required, thereby increasing the overhead considerably. Also, recently SAT
solvers have been demonstrated to be successful in revealing the correct functionality
of a highly camouflaged design, raising doubts about the security of this technique
[32, 48, 17, 3].
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2.2.2 Gate Level Obfuscation
The gate level obfuscation focuses on the protection of the netlist. Logic
encryption is one of the major techniques as shown in Figure 2.2. A set of bits are
I1
I2
I3
I4
I5
I6
K2
K1
O1
O2
Figure 2.2: Logic Encryption example
used as keys which dominate the function of the netlist. These bits are inputs to some
additional logic gates inserted into the netlist. Physically unclonable functions (PUFs)
are functions derived from physical properties of tiny semiconductor components that
are unique to each component. The key bits for logic encryption can be derived from
PUFs, essentially providing a unique key for each chip. Netlist level obfuscation is
considered a countermeasure against hardware trojans [10].
However, SAT attacks have been shown to be successful against such logic
encryption techniques [39, 47]. For circuits having partial or entire sequential por-
tions, a correct ordered sequence of inputs can be used as a key to unlock the netlist
functionality. Since this employs a series of finite states, this is also referred as Finite
State Machine (FSM) based locking [4, 31, 43]. Due to the use of multiple finite
states, this technique imposes high overheads in terms of time, power and area.
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2.2.3 Soft IP Obfuscation
Soft IP obfuscation is implemented at the register transfer level (RTL). Various
methods include RTL logic locking and Encryption of IP. In RTL locking methods,
non-functional states are added to the functional states of the IP after analyzing the
state transition graphs of the Verilog or VHDL code. Until the correct key sequence
is applied to the design, the IP remains in the non-functional states producing no or
incorrect outputs. When the correct key sequence is applied, the IP becomes func-
tional and operates in one of the functional states depending on the input sequence.
Encryption of IP is handled by the trusted design tools i.e. EDA tools that the client
uses to use the encrypted IP without knowing the internal structure [37, 26].
Among these, most of the recently proposed obfuscation techniques utilize
additional keys to implement logic obfuscation [9, 8], which is also referred to as
logic encryption [16]. Recently, a new class of hardware obfuscation techniques that
applies high-level transformations to achieve obfuscation has been proposed [28]. Both
meaningful and non-meaningful obfuscating modes are introduced in these schemes,
which creates another level of ambiguity to protect the device from adversarial attacks.
2.2.4 Printed Circuit Board Level Obfuscation
PCB obfuscation is governed by different constraints than IC obfuscation.
These differences include the differences in design dimension, attack challenges and
opportunities for design modification. These differences limit the possible choices for
PCB level obfuscation. However, gate-level approaches like logic permutation and
logic encryption can be applied to PCB level as well.
Since, the connections on the board are easily discoverable as compared to that
on an IC, adversary has higher flexibility in identifying, removing or bypassing the
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components responsible for obfuscation. In permutation based obfuscation [21, 22],
a permutation block permutes a set of selected inter-component connections using a
permutation network controlled by a key. Before moving onto obfuscation of finite
fields, let’s take a look at the most popular application of finite fields in security
cryptography and coding theory.
2.3 Cryptography and ECC applications
Encryption hides a message from unauthorized read access. Cryptography
also provides authenticity to message as well as the source of the message. Error
correcting codes, on the other hand, enables us to evaluate the integrity of the message
by detecting and correcting error(s) in a message received from a communication
channel.
ECC and cryptography have a few fundamental concepts common to both.
There are a few similarities between ECC and cryptography as was also noted by
[23]:
• Both perform encoding of the message into another format of information.
• Both have theoretical origins from Shannon’s work [42, 41].
• Most algorithms in both domains work on principles of abstract algebra, finite
field mathematics and combinatorial theory.
However, one fundamental difference between the two is that ECC embraces
the variation in the message, attempting to evaluate the error and retrieve the correct
value of the message while, a cryptographic system tries to evaluate any possible
variation to identify even the slightest change in the message in order to strongly
reject a modified received message. For example, a few bit flips in a message received
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by an ECC decoder may still provide the user with the expected output i.e. the
message that was intentionally sent. However, a single bit flip in a message received
by a decryption algorithm will straight away reject the received message as a bad
input and deny the user the access to the correct message.
Owing to the similarities in the mathematical concepts and in terms of the
subject of the application, there have been some interesting research in the overlap-
ping fields of ECC and cryptography [23]. Linear error correcting codes have been
used in developing cryptographic solutions as in the case of [14]. Linear secret shar-
ing schemes are used in a certain area of cryptography for applications such as secret
sharing, multi-party computation as well as two-party primitives. In 2015, Baldi et
al invented a method of using public key cryptography using the concepts of error
correcting codes [1].
2.4 Hardware Obfuscation for Cryptography and
ECC
In [35], a method to protect hardware implementation of Advanced Encryption
Scheme (AES) was proposed by shifting down the inversion operation from GF (28) to
GF (22), since linear operations like inversion are easy to mask in smaller fields. They
concluded that they could achieve significant masking against first-order side-channel
attacks by combining the concepts of multiplicative and additive masking. Obfusca-
tion using high-level transformation was obtained for Digital Signal Processing (DSP)
circuits using Finite State Machines (FSM) based obfuscation [28]. They were able to
achieve an area overhead of about 17% for an Infinite Impulse Response (IIR) filter
using a 128-bit key. [9] proposed RTL obfuscation design using data and control flow
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to incorporate FSM based obfuscation. Many have proposed obfuscation techniques
using FSMs and other mathematical tools [31, 36, 46, 49]. To the best of my knowl-
edge, there has been no previous work specifically focused on the obfuscation of the
hardware implementation of finite field based algorithms, be it cryptography or error
correction codes.
2.5 Our Focus
In our work, we focus on hardware obfuscation methodology for finite field
arithmetic circuits. This includes many error correcting codes as well as cryptogra-
phy solutions. The Rijndael AES [15] uses a number of Galois field units. Coding
theory also relies heavily on finite field based computation. We demonstrate a useful
method for strengthening the security of hardware implementation of such algorithms.
We demonstrate our technique and our analysis of its benefits, on one of the most
popular coding theory algorithm known as Reed-Solomon error correction code. For
proper understanding of our implementation, we provide a background on finite field
arithmetic and the conceptual design of the Reed-Solomon decoding process in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Background
In this chapter, we provide an overview of finite field arithmetic and its ap-
plication for cryptography and error correcting codes. We will also discuss the use
of hardware obfuscation and various methods by which hardware obfuscation can be
achieved in today’s world.
3.1 Finite Fields
A field is a set of elements on which the operations of addition and multiplica-
tion are defined. The operations are commutative, associative, and closed as shown
below.
• a+ b = b+ a (Commutative Property of Addition)
• ab = ba (Commutative Property of Multiplication)
• a+ b = b+ a (Associative Property of Addition)
• a(bc) = (ab)c (Associative Property of Multiplication)
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Closure implies that the sum and product of any two elements in the field are also
elements of the field. The distributive law relates multiplication and addition by
• a ( b + c ) = ab + ac
The additive and multiplicative identities (0 and 1) exist for all elements in the field.
• a+ 0 = a (Additive Identity)
• 1× a = a (Multiplicative Identity)
The additive and multiplicative identities are not the same.
The elements of a field also have additive and multiplicative inverses. The
additive inverse b and the multiplicative inverse c of the element a from a field satisfy
the following relations:
• a+ b = 0
• a× c = 1
Since there is an additive inverse, the operation of subtraction is also defined in a field.
Similarly, the existence of multiplicative inverse implies the operation of division.
Popularly known and commonly used fields having an infinite number of el-
ements are the one consisting of the real numbers R, the complex numbers C, and
the rational numbers Q. because only +1 and −1 have multiplicative inverses, the
integers under the usual arithmetic (Z), do not constitute a field. Although the real,
complex, and rational fields belong to the set of infinite fields. The fields consisting
of finite number of elements are called the finite fields. The symbol Zp refers to the
set of integers 0, 1, 2, . . . , p− 1 using modulo p arithmetic. Zp is a field if and only if
p is a prime number. Regardless of whether or not p is prime, each element x has an
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additive inverse with the value (p− x). This follows from the fact that
x+ p− x = p
= 0 mod p
(3.1)
p being prime, there exists an element y in the field such that x× y = 1 mod p. y is
called the multiplicative inverse of x.
If p is not a prime number, then p can be factored as p = ab where 1 < a,
b < p. The product of a and b, ab = 0 mod p. In this case, a and b are the divisors
of zero. Fields satisfy a cancellation law: ac = ad implies c = d, and the following
argument shows that a field cannot have divisors of zero. Zp for p not prime is not
a field. For any such finite field, it will always be the case each row of the addition
is a permutation of the values 0, 1, . . . , p− 1 and each row of the multiplication table
except the first row will also be a permutation of the elements of the field. As noted
previously, a value of 1 in the multiplication table identifies a pair of multiplicative
inverses.
3.1.1 Galois fields
If p is a prime number, then it is also possible to define a field with pm elements
for any m. These fields are named after the great French algebraist Evariste Galois
who was killed in a duel at the age of 20. They have many applications in coding
theory. The elements of Galois Field GF (pm) is defined as
GF (pm) =(0, 1, 2, . . . , p− 1) ∪ (p, p+ 1, p+ 2, . . . , p+ p− 1)
∪ (p2, p2 + 1, p2 + 2, . . . , p2 + p− 1) ∪ . . .
∪ (pm−1, pm−1 + 1, pm−1 + 2, . . . , pm−1 + p− 1)
(3.2)
22
where p ∈ P and m ∈ Z+. The order of the field is given by pm while p is called the
characteristic of the field. Also note that the degree of polynomial of each element
is at most (m − 1). The fields, denoted GF (pm), are comprised of the polynomials
of degree (m− 1) over the field Zp. These polynomials are expressed as a (m− 1)×
(m − 1) + · · · + a1 × 1 + a0 × 0 where the coefficients ai take on values in the set
0, 1, . . . , p− 1. When employed in coding applications p is commonly 2 and thus the
coefficients a0, . . . , am−1 are taken from the binary digits 0, 1. Consider the following
example where
GF (5) = (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) (3.3)
which consists of 5 elements where each of them is a polynomial of degree 0 (a
constant) while
GF (23) = (0, 1, 2, 2 + 1, 22, 22 + 1, 22 + 2, 22 + 2 + 1)
= (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
(3.4)
which consists of 23 = 8 elements where each of them is a polynomial of degree at
most 2 evaluated at 2.
In coding applications, for m <= 32, it is common to represent an entire
polynomial in GF (2m) as a single integer value in which individual bits of the integer
represents the coefficients of the polynomial. The least significant bit of the integer
represents the a0 coefficient.
3.1.2 Finite field polynomial arithmetic in GF (2m)
Addition and multiplication of polynomial coefficients, but not the polyno-
mials themselves in the field GF (2m) are defined by the rules of Z2. Addition is
defined by the exclusive OR operation and multiplication by the AND operation.
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These operations are used in manipulating the coefficients during multiplication and
addition of polynomials, but the basic algorithms used in adding and multiplying
polynomials over the integers remain applicable[5].
3.1.2.1 Addition and Additive Inverse
To add two or more polynomials, for each power of x present in the summands,
one needs to just add the corresponding coefficients modulo 2. If a particular power
appears an odd number of times in the summands it will have a coefficient of 1 in the
sum. If it appears an even number of times or does not appear at all, it will have a
coefficient of 0 in the sum. For example,
(x2 + 1) + (x+ 1) + (x2 + x+ 1) = 1. (3.5)
Note that the polynomials of degree (m − 1) are closed under polynomial addition.
The sum is always a polynomial of degree no more than degree (m− 1).
Consider the following example. Suppose we are working in GF (28), then
84 + 247 is
84 + 247 = (26 + 24 + 22) + (27 + 26 + 25 + 24 + 22 + 21 + 20)
= 27 + 2 · 26 + 25 + 2 · 24 + 2 · 22 + 21 + 20
= 27 + 25 + 21 + 20
= 163
(3.6)
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Alternatively, from binary numeral system perspective,
84 + 247 = 01010100 + 11110111
= 10100011
= 163
(3.7)
and the results coincide. Furthermore, because of the XOR method of addition, each
polynomial is its own additive inverse.
3.1.2.2 Multiplication and Multiplicative Inverse
Multiplication requires more tedious work. Suppose a(x) and b(x) are poly-
nomials in GF (pm) and let p(x) be an irreducible polynomial (or a polynomial that
cannot be factored) of degree at least m in GF (pm). We want p(x) to be a polyno-
mial of degree at least n so that the product of two a(x) and b(x) does not exceed
11111111 = 255 as the product needs to be stored as a byte. If c(x) denotes the
resulting product then
c(x) = (a(x) · b(x))(mod p(x)) (3.8)
On the other hand, the multiplicative inverse of a(x) is given by inv(a(x)) such that
(a(x) · inv(a(x)))(mod p(x)) = 1 (3.9)
Note that figuring out the product of two polynomials and the multiplicative inverse
of a polynomial requires both reducing coefficients modulo x and reducing polynomi-
als modulo p(x). The reduced polynomial can be calculated easily with long division
while the best way to compute the multiplicative inverse is by using Extended Eu-
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clidean Algorithm. The details on the calculations in GF (28) is best explained in the
following example. Suppose we are working in GF (28) and we take the irreducible
polynomial modulo p(x) to be x8 + x6 + x5 + x1 + x0. To calculate 13 · 84, we need
to go through several steps. First, we compute the product of the polynomial and
reduce the coefficients modulo 2.
138˙4 = ((23 + 22 + 20) · (26 + 24 + 22))(mod p(x))
= (29 + 28 + 27 + 2 · 26 + 25 + 2 · 24 + 22)(mod p(x))
= (29 + 28 + 27 + 25 + 22)(mod p(x))
(3.10)
Then we use long division to compute the reduced polynomial as follows
Quotient Remainder
29 + 28 + 27 + 25 + 22
28 + 26 + 25 + 21 + 20
21 + 20 20
(3.11)
Where the last entry in the first column is the product we seek for. Since the product
is 1, it follows that 84 and 13 are multiplicative inverse pairs. If we assume that we
do not know the multiplicative inverse of 84. Then to calculate the multiplicative
inverse we will use Extended Euclidean Algorithm. Unlike long division, we need
to keep track of the auxiliary when we work with Extended Euclidean Algorithm as
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follows
Quotient Remainder Auxiliary
28 + 26 + 25 + 21 + 20 0
26 + 24 + 22 1
22 25 + 24 + 21 + 20 22
21 + 20 20 23 + 22 + 1
(3.12)
The first two rows in the Remainder column are always the modulo polynomial fol-
lowed by the polynomial we wish to invert. The first two rows in the Auxiliary are
always 0 and 20. The remainder and the quotient in row m is then calculated from
the division of the remainders in row (m − 1) and (m − 2) while the auxiliary in
row m is given by the sum of the auxiliary in row (m − 2) and the product of the
quotient and the auxiliary in row (m− 1) until the last remainder equals to 20. The
final entry in Auxiliary happens to be the multiplicative inverse of the product, thus
the multiplicative inverse of 84 is 23 + 22 + 20 = 13 which agrees with the preceding
example.
The polynomials of degree (m − 1) are not closed under multiplication. For
example, xm−1 × xm−1 is x2m−2. Thus for all m > 1, the degree of the product
may exceed (m − 1). Our objective is to build a field of 2m elements in which the
operations of addition and multiplication are based upon polynomial addition and
multiplication. Thus, we need a mechanism for ensuring that multiplication is closed.
To do this we resort again to modular arithmetic.
A generating polynomial for GF (pm) is a degree m polynomial that is irre-
ducible over Zp. This simply means that it cannot be factored. For example (x
3− 1)
is not irreducible over Z2 because it can be factored as (x
2 +x+ 1)(x+ 1). Note that
this factorization works only over Z2 but not Z. If an irreducible polynomial p(x) can
be found, then polynomial multiplication can be defined as standard polynomial mul-
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tiplication modulo p(x). That is, to compute the product a(x)b(x), we need to first
compute c(x) = a(x)b(x) and then transform c(x) back into the set of polynomials of
degree (m− 1) by taking the remainder when c(x) is divided by p(x). If c(x) already
has degree no larger than (m − 1), then the remainder is simply c(x), but if this is
not the case, the remainder is guaranteed to have degree no higher than (m− 1).
Note that the requirement that p(x) be irreducible is implicit in this definition
of multiplication. Suppose p(x) is not irreducible. Then there exist two polynomials
a(x) and b(x) such that p(x) = a(x)b(x). However, p(x) = 0 mod p(x). Hence a(x)
and b(x) are divisors of zero, and it has previously been shown that fields may not
contain zero divisors.
3.2 Reed-Solomon Codes
Figure 3.1 shows a typical error correction process using the Reed-Solomon
(RS) encoder and decoder. The RS encoder takes the message to be transmitted as
a block of digital data, and adds redundant bits to the block. A noisy transmission
channel introduces errors in the transmitted message block. The decoder processes
the received block and attempts to correct the errors to recover the original message
data. The redundant bits help the decoder to recover the message from the corrupted
received codeword. The error correction capability in terms of the type and the
number of errors that the system can correct, is determined by the RS code used.
RS codes defined over GF (2m) are popular error-correcting codes used in dig-
ital communications and data storage. RS codes are a subset of the Bose-Chaudhuri-
Hocquenghem (BCH) [7] codes which are a subset of cyclic block codes. Cyclic block
codes belong to the family of the block codes for error correction in general. [19].
Given the value m for the Galois field extension GF (Pm), a set of RS codes can
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Figure 3.1: Error Correction using RS Codes
be constructed with different block lengths, error correction capabilities and correction
rates. The primitive element a(x) and the field generator polynomial F (x) are used
to construct each of the Pm unique code symbols. The generator polynomial p(x)
having its roots from GF (Pm) field, provides the information for the parity check.
The values of p(x), m an n define a n, k RS code. However, when we get into the
implementation we need to also know P (2 for ECC in most cases), F (x) (which is
the primitive polynomial p(x) in most cases), a(x) (x = α in almost all cases), and
αG (any primitive element of GF (Pm) using F (x) which is almost always set to α1).
3.2.1 Encoder
The encoders for Reed-Solomon use a systematic encoding architecture using
a linear feedback shift register as shown in Figure 3.2. For an RS(n, k) encoder, n−k
stages of multiplier-adder pairs are used. The multipliers are constant multipliers with
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Figure 3.2: Encoding process for Reed-Solomon Code
coefficients of the generator polynomial, p(x) as the constants. This architecture takes
n clock cycles to encode an input word. However, parallel architectures have also been
invented to perform the encoding at much higher rates.
3.2.2 Decoder
A number of algorithms have been proposed for decoding of RS codes. One
category of decoders known as Hard Decision decoders, which have lower error cor-
rection capability as well as lower complexity. Soft decision decoders have higher
error correction capability and higher complexity. Examples of the hard decision de-
coding algorithms include the Euclidean algorithm, the Peterson-Gorenstein-Zierler
algorithm and Berlekamp-Welch algorithm. In this dissertation, we focus on the
Reformulated inversionless Berlekamp-Massey Algorithm (RiBM) for our implemen-
tation of the decoder, shown in Figure 3.3.
The decoding process is executed in five-stages involving the following steps:
1. Calculation of the syndromes from the received word.
2. Calculation of the error-locator word from the syndromes.
3. Calculation of the error locations within the received word from the error-locator
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numbers.
4. Calculation of the error magnitudes at each error location from the syndromes
and the error-locator numbers.
5. Calculation of the decoded codeword from the received word using the calculated
error locations and error magnitudes.
Received Word R(x)
Syndrome
Computation
Key
Equation
Solver
Chien Search
(Error Locator)
Forney’s
Algorithm
(Error
Evaluator)
Error Correction
FIFO Register
Corrected Word C(x)
Syndromes
Ω(x) Λ(x)
Ω(αi)
Λ(αi)
error valueerror location
S(x)
Figure 3.3: Reed-Solomon Decoder Block Diagram
First, we calculate the 2t syndrome components or in other words, the syndrome
S(x). The syndromes can be determined by either of the two methods:
Si = R(α
I)(= E(αI)). (3.13)
or
s(x) = R(x)mod p(x)
= REM [R(x)/p(x)].
(3.14)
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where Si = s(α
I) from I = GI from p(x).
From all the syndromes Si we calculate the error-locator polynomial Ω(x).
This is done by using one of the two methods: the Berlekamp-Massey’s method for
error-locator polynomial or the linear recursion method. Next, from the error-locator
polynomial Ω(x), we calculate the error-locator numbers zi for i = l, 2, 3, . . . , T . Then
we calculate the error locations λi for i = l, 2, 3, . . . , T . Error locations are the roots
of the error magnitude polynomial, Λ(x). The error locations can be calculated using
one of the two methods, namely, the Explicit Method and the Chien Search Method.
From the error-locator numbers zi and the syndrome components Si, we cal-
culate the error values λi for i = l, 2, 3, . . . , T . From the error locations, ωi and the
error values λi, the estimate of the error polynomial E(x). In the final stage, the
determination of the nearest code word C(x)′ is done from R(x) and E(x). R(x) and
E(x) can be XOR added to reproduce the original codeword C(X).
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Chapter 4
Research Methodology
We use an implementation of Reed-Solomon Decoder with the Reformulated
inversion-less Berlekamp-Massey architecture to illustrate the proposed hardware ob-
fuscation idea. Our idea is to incorporate a reconfigurable design to all the finite field
multiplier units to achieve obfuscation without increasing significant overhead.
4.1 RS decoder
As explained in the previous section, the decoder consists of three steps as
shown in Figure 3.3: syndrome computation (SC), key equation solver (KES), and
Chien search. After this, the obtained Error polynomial, E(x) is bitwise XOR’ed with
the received word to obtain the corrected code-word. Our implementation of the RS
decoder uses a partial parallel architecture for the syndrome computation block and
the RiBM architecture for the KES block.
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4.2 Syndrome Computation: J-Parallel Architec-
ture
Recall that α is a primitive element of GF (2m) and R(x) is the received code-
word represented as a binary polynomial. A RS(n, k) code can correct t = (n− k)/2
errors in the R(x). For an t error-correcting code, 2t syndromes sj (1 < j ≤ 2t)
are computed as R(αj). This requires the use of constant multipliers. Constant
multipliers are implemented as binary constant matrix multiplications using XOR
trees. Using 2t syndrome computation cells each with a constant multiplier work in
the syndrome computation block to generate 2t syndromes for each received word.
The syndrome computation can be implemented in a serial manner as illustrated
in Figure 4.6a. The value in the register is multiplied with αj in each clock cycle.
The output from the multiplier is added to the input symbol and the result is again
stored in the register for calculation of the next syndrome. It takes n clock cycles
to calculate j syndromes. However, for faster computation of syndromes, the serial
architecture can be upgraded into a parallel architecture by using 2t copies of the
serial computation unit. Since, syndromes are values evaluated from a polynomial, a
design similar to the Chien search can also be used for computation of syndromes.
We use the J-parallel architecture to speed up the process which looks like
Figure 4.1 at the RTL Level. Each cell in the block is basically a single serial syndrome
computation unit. J coefficients of the received word are grouped together and then
the Horner’s rule for converting the polynomial in a more computationally efficient is
applied to obtain this parallel architecture. A J-parallel architectures need n/J clock
cycles to compute each syndrome. If J = n, then no feedback loop is required. In
such a design, all syndromes can be calculated in a single clock period.
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Figure 4.1: Syndrome computation block using J-Parallel architecture showing a stack
of syndrome computation cells operating simultaneously to produce 2t syndromes per
clock cycle
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4.3 KES Block: RiBM Architecture
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Figure 4.2: Key Equation solver (KES) block based on the RiBM architecture.
The syndromes are used by the KES block to calculate the two polynomials,
viz. Λ(x) and an error evaluator polynomial Ω(x) are computed from the syndromes in
the KES step. Most practical systems adopt finite field GF (2m) (m ∈ Z+). GF (2m)
consists of 2m elements. Each element is represented by an m-bit binary vector or
equivalently as the coefficients of a degree (m − 1) binary polynomial. Addition
operation is evaluated as a bit-wise XOR. The multiplication between a(x), b(x) ∈
GF (2m) is defined as c(x) = a(x)b(x) mod p(x), where p(x) is a degree-m binary
irreducible polynomial. Let
a(x) = am−1xm−1 + a1x+ a0. (4.1)
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Figure 4.3: RiBM’s PE architecture
Then the field multiplication of a(x) and b(x) is calculated as:
c(x) = a0b(x) + a1(b(x)x) mod p(x) + · · ·+ am−1(b(x)xm−1 mod p(x)). (4.2)
where
b(x)x mod p(x) = (bm−2⊕pm−1)xm−1+(bm−3⊕pm−2)xm−2+· · ·+(b0⊕p1)x+p0x. (4.3)
and b(x)xi for i > 1 are computed in the same manner iteratively.
One of the most efficient architectures for the KES step is the reformulated
inversion-less Berlekamp-Massey (RiBM) architecture [38] shown in Figure 4.2. It
consists of (3t+ 1) copies of the processing element (PE) block shown in Figure 4.3.
Of these, each of the 3t instances of the PE block contains two instances of a GF (2m)
multiplier. The remaining one PE unit contains one GF (2m) multiplier. According
to equation (4.3), the multiplier is implemented by the architecture in Figure 4.4,
and the XTime block implements multiplication with x. The XTime block design
is dependent on the primitive polynomial, p(x). In Figure 4.5, an example for the
XTime block is shown for p(x) = 111000011. The bit outputs corresponding to a set
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Figure 4.4: GF Multiplier
bit in the primitive polynomial, p(x), are bitwise XORs of the corresponding previous
bit and the most significant bit of the input byte. Thus for different p(x), the XTime
architecture will be different.
4.4 Chien Search and Error Evaluator Block: Par-
tial Parallel Design
The roots of the error locator polynomial, Λ(x) provide the locations of the
error in the received codeword. Λ(x) has a root of α−i indicates that the ith symbol
in the received codeword is corrupted by an error value. Similarly to obtain the value
of the error that has infected a symbol, roots of the error evaluator, also known as
error magnitude polynomial, Ω(x) are required to be calculated. Adding the error
magnitude to the infected symbol indicated by the roots of Λ(x) will give the correct
symbol that was originally transmitted. Chien search is carried out on Λ(x) and Ω(x)
to find the roots, which are used to generate the error locations and magnitudes.
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Figure 4.5: XTime for p(x) = 111000011
In the original Block Matching Algorithm (BMA) algorithm, calculation of roots of
the Ω(x) is only possible after the roots of Λ′(x) have been obtained, where Λ′(x) =
Λ1 + Λ3x
2 + Λ4x
3 . . . . In the case of binary finite fields, consider the two polynomials
derived from the even and odd coefficients of Λ(x), i.e. for
Λ(x) = Λ0 + Λ1x+ Λ2x
2 . . . . (4.4)
its even and odd polynomials are
Λodd(x) = Λ1 + Λ3x
3 + Λ5x
5 . . . ; Λeven(x) = Λ0 + Λ2x
2 + Λ4x
4 . . . . (4.5)
Consequently,
Λodd(x) = xΛ
′(x). (4.6)
Therefore, the values evaluated from a separate Chien search block over the odd
polynomial can be used for calculation of the error magnitude values [11].
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Figure 4.6: Individual cells in the parallel architectures of the syndrome computation
and Chien search blocks
Thus, the Chien search architecture can also be made to be partially parallel.
The design we implemented in our experiment is shown in Figure 4.7. As can be noted
from the design of the individual cells in the Chien Search block shown in Figure 4.6b,
each Chien search block employs a constant multiplier in which the constant is a power
of α, a primitive element in GF (2m). The Chien search architecture also consists of
arrays of constant multipliers.
Chien Search
Λeven(x)
=0?
Chien Search
Λodd(x)
Inversion
Chien Search
Ω(x)
α−iΛ′(α−i)
Λ(α−i)
α−1
Ω(α−i)
ei
α−i
Figure 4.7: Chien Search and error evaluation architecture
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4.5 Reconfigurable Finite Field Units
As discussed in the previous sections, the implementation of the XTime block
is decided by the irreducible polynomial p(x). Since this polynomial is not unique,
the general multipliers can be designed to be reconfigurable according to a different
p(x) which can be efficiently exploited for hardware obfuscation. A key can be used to
control the mode of operation of the XTime block where different modes correspond to
different primitive polynomials incorporated in the unit’s reconfigurable design. Other
legitimate polynomials integrated into the design can serve as meaningful obfuscating
modes. In addition, this reconfigurable GF multiplier can be leveraged to operate
on the input for the same number of iterations to maintain nearly indistinguishable
side-channel leakage profile, while still yielding incorrect outputs for the incorrectly
applied keys. From the section 4.3 we also know that the XTime block is instantiated
(m − 1) times in a GF (2m) multiplier that operates on the input (m − 1) times
recursively. This creates a large degree of freedom for the obfuscation combined by
all the instances that are extremely suitable for hardware obfuscation.
A similar concept also applies to the syndrome computation block as well as
the Chien search block. As discussed in the previous section and shown in Figure 4.6,
both have constant multipliers for multiplication withm×m binary constant matrices.
The entries of the constant multipliers are determined according to p(x). Figure
4.8a and Figure 4.8b show the modified designs of cell templates in the syndrome
computation and Chien search blocks, respectively. In Figure 4.6, we observed that
each root computation cell in the syndrome computation block as well as in each of
the Chien search block, contains a constant field multiplier unit.
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Figure 4.8: Individual cells using a control signal for reconfiguration.
4.6 Final Design
In the final design of our version of RS decoder, we leverage the concepts
of reconfigurability discussed above to exploit it to build a hardware design of the
decoder which should also provide security against IP theft and reverse engineering.
In the syndrome computation and Chien search blocks, we replace the default
constant multipliers with instances of the new reconfigurable constant multiplier de-
signed for a number of primitive polynomials. A control signal, S will switch the
mode of operation of the multiplier. The value of the control signal will be dependent
on the applied key. For correct key value, the control signal activates the mode of
operation of the constant multiplier corresponding to the correct value of p(x). For an
incorrect value of the applied key, the activated mode can be any of those associated
with the other primitive polynomials. For an adversary, both of these modes appear
to be meaningful modes, since in both modes, the computation inside the decoder is
similar to a decoder with the corresponding polynomial as the correct polynomial.
The decision about the length of the key is left to the designer. It is a widely accepted
fact that a longer key generally provides a higher level of security. However, longer
keys may incur higher overheads of hardware complexity.
The general GF multiplier in the KES’ PE units, are directly configured ac-
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cording to the primitive polynomials and the key length. The modifications are similar
to that for constant multipliers, the difference being that the design changes are in
the XTime block which is instantiated in the GF multipliers. We tested multiple
configurations and key lengths, which we describe in the next section.
4.7 Configurations
Numerous different configurations can be employed in our proposal of re-
configurable finite field units. We consider two main configurations.Two primitive
polynomials and four polynomials for reconfigurations.
in2
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in4
in5
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in1
in0
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out4
out5
out3
out2
out1
out0
S
Figure 4.9: Obfuscated XTime block with an 1-bit key: x = 0, XTime works for
p(x) = 111000011; x = 1, XTime works for q(x) = 111100111.
In the case of using two polynomials, we assume that one correct polynomial
is p(x) and the incorrect polynomial is q(x). Since there are only two modes of
operation for the XTime block, a one-bit control signal is sufficient. This means that
if the applied key to the chip is correct, then the control signal puts the XTime block
in the mode corresponding to p(x) which enables the decoder to work as a normal
functional decoder for polynomial, p(x). On the other hand, incorrect key causes
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the control signal to put the chip into a mode suitable for q(x) but not for p(x).
An implementation for the reconfigurable XTime block, with p(x) = 111000011 =
x8 + x7 + x6 + x+ 1 and q(x) = 111100111 = x8 + x7 + x6 + x5 + x2 + x+ 1, is shown
in Figure 4.9, where S represents the single-bit control signal.
This means that the decoder will still try to find any errors in R(x) but will
possibly fail. It will fail because according to the syndromes produced the number
of errors will be beyond its error correction capability. The control signal or the key
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
= XOR
Input[7..0]
Output[6]
αi=01011011
αj=11100001S
Figure 4.10: An example of the reconfigurable constant multiplier.
itself needs to be propagated from the higher level main external module to each of
the XTime blocks inside each of the GF multipliers, as well as inside each of the
constant multiplier. The constant multiplier is also redesigned into a reconfigurable
constant multiplier design for different αi value of the multiplier’s constant. An ex-
ample design for αi = 11100001 corresponding to one polynomial, and αj = 11100001
corresponding to another polynomial, with a single bit control signal, S is shown in
Figure 4.10. For our experiment, we considered two sub-cases for the setup of one
correct primitive polynomial and one incorrect polynomial - a single bit control sig-
nal, and a two bit control signal. Additionally, we also experiment with the case of
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four polynomials, in which there is one correct polynomial, p(x) and three incorrect
polynomials, q1(x), q2(x) and q3(x). Let us discuss each of the three cases in more
detail.
4.7.1 One additional primitive polynomial with a single-bit
control signal
S polynomial mode operation
1 p(x) meaningful correct
0 q(x) non-meaningful incorrect
Table 4.1: Modes for a single-bit control signal and two polynomial reconfigurable
design
When a single-bit control signal is used in the multiplier design for polynomial
selection, a NOT gate is required to invert the signal. This is considered an optimized
design where inversion is done only once. Thus an overhead of only one gate cell for
each of the XTime blocks in the general GF multipliers, and one gate cell overhead
for each constant multiplier block is achieved. Outside the multipliers, only one
control signal wire is routed across the parent blocks such as the cells in syndrome
computation and Chien search blocks, and the PE units in the KES block.
4.7.2 One additional primitive polynomial with a two-bit
control signal
The overhead of inverting the control signal in every constant multiplier and
every XTime block in the general multipliers can be avoided by using a two-bit control
signal (one bit for each primitive polynomial). This design requires no inverters since
each control signal directly maps to one of the modes. Additionally, this also adds
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S1 S2 polynomial mode operation
0 0 − non-meaningful incorrect
0 1 p(x) meaningful correct
1 0 − non-meaningful incorrect
1 1 q(x) meaningful incorrect
Table 4.2: Modes for a two-bit control signal and two polynomial reconfigurable design
two incorrect modes or non-meaningful modes, which do not correspond to any of
the polynomials considered for the design. Therefore, another layer of ambiguity is
introduced in this case without adding any complexity and overhead for two more
polynomials.
4.7.3 Three additional polynomials (with four bit control sig-
nal)
S1 S2 S3 S4 polynomial mode operation
0 0 0 0 − non-meaningful incorrect
0 0 0 1 p(x) meaningful correct
0 0 1 0 q1(x) meaningful incorrect
0 1 0 0 q2(x) meaningful incorrect
1 0 0 0 q3(x) meaningful incorrect
0 0 1 1 − non-meaningful incorrect
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
1 1 1 1 − non-meaningful incorrect
Table 4.3: Modes for a four-bit control signal and four polynomial reconfigurable
design
For a higher level of security, the number of operating modes can be increased
by having more polynomials incorporated in the GF multipliers and the constant
multipliers. A total of four operating modes will need a control signal of a minimum
of two bits driven by the values of the applied key. We tested this case with a four-
bit control signal to select from the four modes of operation. Similar to two bit
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control signal for two polynomial modes, four bit control signal for a four polynomial
modes design would discount the overhead of at least two inverters per constant
multiplier and two inverters per XTime block. In this configuration, we would have
four meaningful modes and twelve non-meaningful modes.
In the next chapter, we present our results and analysis of the results.
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Chapter 5
Experimental Results
We implemented the entire GF (28) RS(255,239) decoder design in Verilog
HDL based on the RiBM architecture with some modifications for higher efficiency.
These modifications are adopted from some of the most efficient designs proposed
in the literature. We gave preferences to efficient designs that incorporated parallel
processing of data which can be explored for observation.
The Chien search and error evaluator block is implemented using the J-parallel
architecture [12] so that the computation of the roots of the error locator polynomial
can be partially executed while the computation of the roots of the error evaluator
polynomial is in process. There are 350 XTime units in total in the KES module. In
our experiment, we first considered construction with p(x) = 111000011 as the correct
configuration. However, we further developed designs for all the combinations of the
primitive irreducible polynomials and observed the area, timing and power overheads
in each of the designs. We implemented several obfuscated designs with different
legitimate polynomials under GF (28) through reconfigurable finite field arithmetic
units. Note that in the case of GF (28), there are 30 irreducible polynomials, out
of which 16 are primitive irreducible polynomials that can be used for construction.
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The original architecture and the obfuscated designs are synthesized using Synopsys
Design Compiler with the 32/28nm generic library.
5.1 Impact of Using Combinations of Polynomials
5.1.1 Case 1: Two legitimate polynomials with a 1-bit con-
trol signal
One parameter to select the pair of polynomials is to have the minimum num-
ber of additional cells/gates to build the obfuscated design. In this experiment, we
select the construction corresponding to q(x) = 111100111 as one meaningful obfus-
cating mode, which only has a Hamming distance of 2 to p(x). In the XTime block
for these polynomials, there is an XOR gate for each of the input bits except for
bits 3 and 4. The XOR gates for bit 2 and 3 do not contribute to the output when
the correct key is applied, while the XOR gates for bits 2 and 3 become operational
when the key is configured into the mode corresponding to q(x). Therefore, only 2
additional gates were required and only one-bit control signal is required for each
reconfigurable XTime unit. The reconfigurable XTime block design between these
two polynomials is shown in Figure 4.9.
5.1.2 Case 2: Two legitimate polynomials with a 2-bit con-
trol signal
We also consider the case where the key is mapped to 2-bit control signals for
each reconfigurable finite field arithmetic unit with q(x) = 111100111. In this case,
each of the additional gate in the reconfigurable XTime block is controlled separately.
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5.1.3 Case 3: Four legitimate polynomials with a 4-bit con-
trol signal
We implemented the obfuscated design with q1(x) = 101011111, q2(x) = 111001111, q3(x) =
111110101 as other legitimate primitive polynomials. A 4-bit control signal is mapped
to control each reconfigurable finite field arithmetic unit.
Table 5.1: Overhead for four-polynomial configuration
Area Power Time
10.34% 2.78% 1.31%
11.02% 2.81% 1.31%
5.2 Overheads
The overhead results for the above three cases are summarized in Table 5.2,
which are calculated based on the entire decoder architecture.
Table 5.2: Overhead for each case configuration
Case Area Power Time
1 6.82% 1.23% 7.81%
2 6.17% 1.04% 2.38%
3 10.34% 2.78% 1.31%
It can be seen that the overhead of the proposed hardware obfuscation method-
ology is small, compared to prior works [20, 28]. It can also be concluded that given a
correct construction, different polynomial combinations that are included in the obfus-
cating modes will yield different hardware design costs. Higher number of legitimate
polynomials would certainly increase the design complexity while achieving a higher
level of obfuscation. In addition, our experimental results indicate that introducing
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more control signal could reduce the design complexity within the reconfigurable fi-
nite field arithmetic units. However, using more bits in the meaningful modes would
decrease the degree of freedom for incorporating non-meaningful modes. As a result,
the overall obfuscation level might be reduced. Therefore, the detailed obfuscation
circuit should be carefully designed according to the performance requirement of a
certain application.
5.3 Selecting the Best Polynomial Combination for
Secure Reconfigurable Design
Selecting the number of polynomials and the set of those polynomials to im-
plement a reconfigurable multiplier design is crucial to obtaining a low-overhead and
secure chip. For a four-polynomial reconfigurable module, one of the P (16, 4) (per-
mutation function, P (n, r)) (assuming all four selections are unique) permutations
can be used. In order to select the combination wisely the area, power and timing
overheads of each combination needs to be compared.
For a two-polynomial reconfigurable module, one of the 16P2 combinations can
be used. We developed RS decoder designs for each of the 16 irreducible primitive
polynomials in GF (28) as the generator polynomial. We then created the set of re-
configurable decoder designs for each configuration, making them reconfigurable by
selecting another irreducible primitive polynomial as the second polynomial (corre-
sponding to the incorrect meaningful mode of the operation).
The variations in the overheads, shown in Figure 5.1 for different values of
the Hamming distance is attributed to the reconfigurable constant multiplier designs.
Since, there is not much flexibility in modifying the ′i′ and the ′α′ values in a RS
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Figure 5.1: Percentage overheads with respect to Hamming Distance between p(x)
and q(x)
decoder for a specific p(x), the variations in the observed overheads are expected to
remain similar for any design of the RS decoder.
The results are presented graphically in Figure 5.2, which validates our hy-
pothesis that a lower hamming distance between the two polynomials yields lower
overall area and power overheads. This is understandable since lower Hamming dis-
tance corresponds to less number of gates that are required to incorporate the design
associated with the second polynomial.
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Figure 5.2: Percentage average overheads with respect to Hamming Distance between
p(x) and q(x)
5.4 The Best Pair of p(x) and q(x)
Our experiment results also revealed the best combinations that can be used
to implement the multipliers with the least overheads in area and power. We present
3 such combinations in Table 5.3.
p(x) q(x) % Area Overhead % Power Overhead
111001111 110000111 3.67 1.45
111001111 101001101 4.06 1.45
111001111 111000011 4.27 1.45
Table 5.3: The least overhead p(x)-q(x) pair
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5.5 Security Analysis
The obfuscation level of the design is dependent on the possible configurations
in each block. Theoretically, if the control signal of each block is mapped from
the key separately, there are maximum 2k configurations in each block, where k
is the length of the key. However, this would require one-to-one mapping for all
the control signals, which incurs significant overhead. In general, we assume the
possible configurations for each syndrome computation block, GF multiplier in the
KES architecture, and constant multiplier in Chien search and Forneys algorithm
as 2S1 , 2S2 , and 2S3 , respectively. Since the syndrome computation block produces
2t syndromes for a received word, there are 2t × 2S1 possible combinations in the
obfuscated design.
In addition, the KES block computes the polynomials, Λ(x) and Ω(x) using
(6t+ 2)(m− 1) XTime blocks that can take 2S2 arithmetic forms. As each coefficient
in KES is computed using the parameters obtained for the previous coefficients, these
units cumulatively contribute in final coefficient value. Furthermore, Chien Search
and Forneys algorithm also consist of (4t−2) constant multipliers that can be mapped
into 2S3 configurations each depending upon the value of control signal. Therefore, the
overall obfuscation level of the proposed design is about (48t4−56t3 +8t)×2S1+S2+S3 .
However, the RS decoder may not change the output if it concludes that the
errors are more than it’s designed to correct. Adding an FSM based obfuscation layer
between these blocks can change this behaviour causing the decoder to produce a
different output even if the number of errors is beyond its correction capability.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Discussion
In Chapter 1, we discussed the various security challenges that today’s semi-
conductor industry and the electronic industry faces, which includes basically all the
computing-based industries viz. embedded systems, data centres, cloud servers, web
servers, governments, military equipment, wearable technology as well as individuals
themselves. The main focus of our work is to propose a design methodology which
can be widely employed in different kind of semiconductor chips. These techniques
can be useful to semiconductor IP and IC design companies as well as their clients in
building trust with their respective clients and also to keep their business essentials
secure.
In chapter 2, we presented a brief background of the IC design supply chain,
finite field arithmetic and its applications in coding theory, that will enable the reader
to understand the applicability and nature of this research work.
In chapter 3, we went over the recent research progress in the field of hardware
obfuscation. We particularly discussed obfuscation with regard to logic encryption
and finite field circuits. We acknowledged some of the work that has contributed to
our study and analysis, the open challenges that we could take up in order to produce
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this work.
In chapter 4, we discussed the details of our research methodology and our
approach in producing better designs of the hardware units for a RS decoder. We
explained the designs we chose as the basis of our initial implementation and the
factors that make them a better choice for our work. Further, we detailed the changes
we made to the initial designs in order to improve security of the circuits without
compromising on the efficiency and resource consumption of the decoder.
In chapter 5, we presented our findings from our experiment. Our experiment
involved using our method for obfuscation of finite field based circuits to implement
obfuscation in Reed Solomon error correcting codes by the use of reconfigurable units
of finite field computation. We provided results for different scenarios and analyze
them to conclude and strengthen the confidence of our findings. We showed that
using reconfigurable computation units for finite field arithmetic, we can considerably
improve the obscurity of the IC design without having a high overhead.
We produced results for various polynomials and various configurations of
reconfigurability and report our observation. Our observation is that the reconfig-
urability only imposes a low overhead over the original design if the key length is
small and it increases with the increase of the key length. Our initial hypothesis that
the overheads, on average, increase with increasing hamming distance between the
polynomials in the set selected for different modes in the reconfigurable arithmetic
units.
For a minimal modification to the circuit, we believe that our design does not
give out any significant information in terms of side channel leakage to indicate that
the circuit was not functioning correctly when the applied key was incorrect. However,
with higher key length and no other method of obfuscation employed, the obscurity
of the design is slightly compromised. To prevent this, FSM based scramblers can be
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used between the major blocks to introduce additional level of obscurity, making the
design more robust to reverse engineering.
In our work, we have presented a novel hardware obfuscation methodology
through re-configurable finite field arithmetic units. The obfuscated design can
achieve a high level of security by incorporating both meaningful and non-meaningful
modes. Techniques for developing efficient obfuscated designs have also been dis-
cussed with the use of a Reed-Solomon decoder as an example.
Future work will be directed towards developing obfuscated architectures for
other applications on the finite field. There are many directions that can be taken
from here to improve upon the work. First, what configuration is the most secure or
the least taxing configuration when putting on the final product. Another question
that immediately follows is how do we verify and prove that this the best possible
configuration without doing an exhaustive search and synthesizing each configuration.
Third, which characteristics of the considered polynomials, the field and the error
correction capability exactly determine if a configuration is supposed to be a secure
one or not and taxing in terms of hardware or not. Furthermore, we only covered
the constant and general GF multipliers which although are the foundation units
of operations in a finite field, may not be the only units that can be augmented or
modified to achieve higher security with lower overheads.
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